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NARCOTICS ON ILLINOIS'S ROADWAYS: DRUGGED
DRIVING'S ILL EFFECTS AFTER MARTIN
INTRODUCTION

A University of Illinois student attends a party and smokes marijuana. A month later, he pulls an "all-nighter" to prepare for an
exam. On his drive home from the final, he is pulled over because one
of his taillights is out. After noticing the student's bloodshot eyesthe result of no sleep and several energy drinks-the officer suspects
that the student is under the influence of alcohol and asks him to take
a breathalyzer test. The results are negative. Still not satisfied, the
officer takes him to the station and conducts a urinary analysis. Trace
amounts of marijuana are discovered in the student's system from his
ingestion several weeks prior.' The student is then charged under Illinois's driving under the influence (DUI) statute, and later convicted,
2
despite there being no evidence of impairment.
If this seems unfair, the feeling is surely compounded when the
crime becomes aggravated. Imagine the same hypothetical, except
that the student has a passenger and gets into an accident for which he
is only partly at fault. Unfortunately, the passenger is killed instantly
after a collision at an uncontrolled intersection. At the hospital, the
student's urine comes back positive for traces of marijuana. These
traces, in addition to the death of the passenger, will lead to an aggravated DUI conviction,3 a felony in the state of Illinois. 4 The student is
likely headed to prison, despite not being remotely affected by the
5
marijuana at the time of the accident.
1. The following two examples are hypotheticals proposed by the author. Of course, several
Illinois cases are representative of similar situations. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 926 N.E.2d
390, 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (affirming a defendant's conviction, despite no proof of impairment,
when cocaine metabolites were found only in his urine); People v. Avery, 661 N.E.2d 361, 363,
365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the State was not required to prove a mental state in
connection with defendant's twelve charges of aggravated DUI).
2. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010).
3. See People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058, 1064-65 (Ill. 2011) ("A driver with controlled substances in his body [commits misdemeanor DUI] simply by driving. When an aggravated DUI
charge is based on a violation of that section, [aggravated DUI] requires a causal link only between the physical act of driving and another person's death. In such a case, the central issue at
trial will be proximate cause, not impairment."). Here, if the student's driving is found to be a
proximate cause of the death, he is guilty of aggravated DUI. Cf id.
4. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (2010).

5. Id. § (d)(2)(G).
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Recent academics have labeled offenders like the student above as

"drugged drivers," a group that has been increasingly prosecuted in
recent decades. Recognizing the need to protect people from the dangerous combination of drug use and vehicle operation, many state leg-

islatures have amended their statutory schemes to punish those who
choose to engage in this activity. 6 These statutory schemes are di-

verse. Some states have adopted systems in which the prosecutor
must show that the narcotics actually impaired the defendant at the
time of the arrest, 7 while others create a special case for marijuanasimilar to the presumption of inebriation in many statutes that proscribe driving while under the influence of alcohol. 8 Other jurisdictions exempt marijuana entirely from their drugged driving statutes. 9
Finally, other states provide that any amount of narcotic found in a
defendant's system constitutes grounds for a DUI citation.10 Illinois
belongs to the final group. 1 The Illinois DUI statute proscribes driv6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381(A)(3) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21
§ 4177(a)(6) (Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a)(6) (2011); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-

501(a)(6) (2010); IND. CODE § 9-30-5-1(c) (2012); IOWA CODE § 321J.2(1)(c) (Supp. 2013);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(8) (2006 & Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. § 169A.20(1)(7) (2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 484C.110 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(3) (Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE

§ 4511.19(A)(1)(j) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802(d) (2006 &
Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2(b)(2) (Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517(2)
(Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2009 & Supp. 2012); Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (2012).
For further discussion of several of these statutes, see Charles R. Cordova, Jr., Note, DWI and
Drugs: A Look at Per Se Laws for Marijuana, 7 NEV. L.J. 570, 587-88 (2007).
7. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2009 & Supp. 2012). The pertinent part of Virginia's
statute reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or
train.., while such person is under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other selfadministered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any combination of such
drugs, to a degree which impairshis ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine
or train safely.
Id. (emphasis added)
8. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.110(3) (2012).
9. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.20(7) (2012). The pertinent part of Minnesota's statute reads
as follows:
It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor
vehicle, as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 15, except for motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, within this state or on any boundary water of
this state when:
ANN.

(7) the person's body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in
Schedule I or II, or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 28-1381(A)(3)

(2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21

§ 41 7 7 (a)( 6 ) (Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 40 -6 -391(a)(6) (2011).
11. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a)(6) (2010).
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ing while "there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound" in
12
a person's system.
At various times since its inception, the constitutionality of the Illinois DUI statute, at both the state and federal levels, has come under
attack. 13 The drugged driving prohibition has, however, remained
largely untouched. 14 In a key decision, People v. Fate, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the blanket proscription against "any" drug in
a driver's body was constitutional because it bore a rational relationship to the state's interest in keeping motorists safe and keeping
drugged drivers off of the road. 15 Thus, the first iteration of the above
hypothetical would be controlled by the court's reasoning in Fate:
though one month
technically, the student has committed DUI even
16
has passed since he consumed the marijuana.
In April 2011, the Illinois Supreme Court elaborated on Fate's reasoning in People v. Martin, and held that if a person commits misdemeanor DUI and aggravating factors are present, he commits
aggravated DUI.1 7 According to the court, this is true even if there is
no evidence that the drugs found in a person's system affected his
driving. 18 Thus, Martin controls the second hypothetical: the student
is guilty of aggravated DUI because trace amounts of narcotics were
found in his system and someone died in the accident, even though the
19
drug did not affect his driving capabilities in any manner. Therefore,
20
the driver in the second scenario will be convicted of a felony.
This Note examines the implications of the court's holding in Martin. Part II begins by detailing the jurisprudential development that
guided the Martin court, examining both case law and statutory history. Part III analyzes the Martin decision itself. In Part IV, this Note
argues that, with regard to marijuana, the court's holding in Martin
was based on flawed reasoning and rests on questionable constitu12. Id.
13. See, e.g., People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 549-50 (I11.1994); People v. Braman, 765 N.E.2d
500, 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that defendant's extended-term sentence based upon prior
DUI convictions was not a violation of his due process rights); People v. Seefeldt, 445 N.E.2d
427, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding that the phrase "under the influence of intoxicating liquor"
was not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Guynn, 338 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)
(finding the statute's application to incidents on private property was not unconstitutional), abrogated by People v. Cummings, 530 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
14. Compare 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (2010), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3
(2000).
15. See Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 550.
16. Cf id.
17. See Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1065.
18. Id. at 1062-63, 1065.
19. Cf. id. at 1064-65.
20. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (2010); cf Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1064-65.
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tional ground, which may lead to arbitrary enforcement. Finally, Part
V analyzes how the Martin ruling will impact the state of Illinois.
Essentially, the rationale of the Martin court should not apply to
marijuana, even though the court made no exception for this specific
substance. This Note advances a reasonable alternative: in order to
correct this problem, yet continue to minimize the dangers of drugged
driving, the Illinois legislature should adopt a new DUI scheme. An
ideal system would treat marijuana differently than other narcotics
and differentiate between psychoactive and inactive marijuana components. 21 Michigan has implemented a system that provides a good
model.22 Adopting this scheme, or one similar to it, would not only
lessen the harmful impact of Martin, but would also permit the legislature to increase the precision with which it prevents and punishes the
wrong that the DUI statute is aimed at correcting.
II.

BACKGROUND

The DUI statute has changed significantly since Illinois adopted it
in 1935.23 Specifically, the legislature made it illegal to drive while
under the influence of a controlled substance. 24 Changes in the statute have been effected by both statutory amendments and judicial
interpretation. 25
21. The Martin court recognized that drivers like the defendant may not actually be impaired:
"Because impairment is not an element of misdemeanor DUI as set forth in section 11-501(a)(1)
and section 11-501(a)(6), DUI, or driving ... may be an inaccurate title for violations of these
subsections. Such violations are essentially driving while presumed impaired." Martin, 955
N.E.2d at 1064 n.1.
22. Michigan prohibits persons from driving while "under the influence of alcoholic liquor, a
controlled substance, or a combination of alcoholic liquor and a controlled substance." MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 257.625(1)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012). However, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that all inactive metabolites that are the by-product of marijuana are "not ... schedule 1 controlled substance[s] under MCL 333.7212 and, therefore, a person cannot be prosecuted under
[the DUI statute] for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of [these metabolites] in his or
her system." People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67, 83 (Mich. 2010). Thus, Michigan distinguishes
between active and inactive traces of marijuana in a driver's system, and only prosecutes those
who are found to have active by-products that could potentially impair their driving capabilities.
Id. at 82.
23. See Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, [unnumbered act], sec. 1, § 47, 1935 Ill.
Laws 1247, 1258 (codified as amended at 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010)); see generally
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS DUI LAWS (2003),
available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/trafficsafety/historydui.pdf.
24. See Act effective Jan. 9, 1990, No. 86-1019, sec. 7, § 11-501, 1989 Ill. Laws 6995, 7017
(amending the Illinois DUI statute to prohibit "any amount" of "cannabis" or "controlled substance" in a driver's blood).
25. See, e.g., id.; Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1064-65; People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 550 (IIl. 1994).
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A.

The Gassman Decision

The first case in the decisions leading to Martin was People v. Gassman, decided by the Illinois Appellate Court in 1993.26 In Gassman,
the defendant was tried for drugged DUI. The relevant portion of the
DUI statute at that time stated that a "person shall not drive or be in
actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while ... there
is any amount of a drug, substance or compound in such person's
blood or urine resulting7 from the unlawful use or consumption of... a
2
controlled substance.
Steven Gassman was pulled over for driving with a defective headlight, but upon observing Gassman's demeanor and smelling alcohol
on his breath, the officer searched his car. 28 The search revealed open
beer cans, a hash pipe, and a bag of marijuana. 29 After arresting him
for possession of marijuana, the officer conducted a breathalyzer test
that indicated a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.04. 3 0 Because the officer believed Gassman was more inebriated than this result suggested, his blood and urine were also tested. 31 Gassman's
blood tested positive for marijuana. 32 Because the statute prohibited
the presence of any amount of narcotic in a driver's bloodstream,
that the
Gassman was convicted. 33 He immediately appealed, arguing
34
statute created an impermissible absolute liability offense.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction and held that
while the statute created an "absolute liability" offense, traffic laws
are "regulatory, as opposed to penal" and, thus, "a defendant's intent,
knowledge, or motive is immaterial to the question of guilt. The only
intention necessary for liability . . . is the doing of the act prohib26. People v. Gassman, 622 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
27. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a)(5) (1992). The defendant was prosecuted for drugged
driving under a different statutory scheme. See ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(a)(5)
(1990). However, while Illinois recodified its statutory compilation in 1992, see Act effective
Sept. 3, 1992, No. 87-1005, 1992 Ill. Laws 2188, the recodification did not effect any substantive
changes to the DUI statute.
28. Gassman, 622 N.E.2d at 848.
29. Id.
30. Id. Blood alcohol concentration means "either grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath." 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501.2(a)(5)
(2010). This is measured in a percentage. For example, a BAC of 0.20 means that one part in
500 in an individual's blood is alcohol.
31. Gassman, 622 N.E.2d at 848.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 847.
34. Id. Traffic offenses are often deemed "public welfare offenses," which, unlike criminal
violations, do not always require a mens rea. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
250-63 (1952).
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ited. ' '35 The most important evidence for the State in Gassman was
the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Benson. 36 In examining his testimony,
the court stated:
Although there is a general correlation between the level of cannabis use and impairment, Dr. Benson stressed that the relationship
was not simple. He could not say with certainty either that the
small amount of cannabinoids in the defendant's blood would37impair driving or that such an amount would not impair driving.
For the appellate court, this testimony was dispositive. According
to the court, the legislature's intent in passing the drugged DUI statute was to protect the public from drivers under the influence of illegal drugs. 38 The absolute liability prohibition against "any" amount of
drugs in a driver's system was made necessary by the difficulty in measuring the effects of various amounts of narcotics on a person's ability
39
to drive, as stated by Dr. Benson.
Finally, because this prohibition was part of the Illinois Vehicle
Code, violations of which do not require a mental state, and not a
criminal offense, it was constitutionally permissible for the statute to
impose absolute liability. 40 Thus, Gassman was guilty of drugged DUI
because traces of drugs were found in his body and he was operating a
motor vehicle; the State was not required to prove impairment. 41
B.

The Fate Decision

One year later, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Gassman decision in People v. Fate.42 This was the state supreme court's first opportunity to address the issue. 4 3 On October 10, 1992, defendant
Vincent Fate was charged with multiple violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code and the Cannabis Control Act. 44 The State charged and con35. Gassman, 622 N.E.2d at 852 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Teschner, 394
N.E.2d 893, 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See id. at 848-49; see also People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. 1994).
37. Gassman, 622 N.E.2d at 849.
38. Id. at 852-53.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 852; see also People v. Teschner, 394 N.E.2d 893, 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that
while offenses that carry a possible penalty of imprisonment may not be regulated on an absolute-liability basis without clear legislative intent, the "general rule is now well established that
for motor vehicle offenses a defendant's intent, knowledge, or motive is immaterial to the question of guilt"'and absolute liability is appropriate).
41. Gassman, 622 N.E.2d at 852-53.
42. People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Ill.
1994).
43. See id. at 550.
44. Id. at 549-50. Specifically, the "[diefendant was charged with driving while under the
influence of alcohol, unlawful possession of cannabis, illegal transportation of open alcohol, failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, and operation of an uninsured vehicle." Brief for
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victed the defendant under the same DUI statute as the defendant in
45
Gassman.
On appeal, Fate contended that this statute violated his due process
rights under both the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions. 46 Much like the
defendant in Gassman, Fate argued that because the statute was not
"tied to driving impairment," it created an impermissible per se violation. 47 The appellate court agreed and held that section 11-501(a)(5)
violated the Illinois constitution. 48 The court did not find a "sufficient
relationship between the evil to be remedied . . . and the legislative
enactment."49
Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, upholding the defendant's conviction and declaring that while the statute created a per
se violation, it was not unconstitutional. 50 The court reasoned that
impairment produced by ingesting various narcotics, including marijuana, differed from the impairment produced by ingesting alcohol because the relationship between narcotic ingestion and impairment is
unpredictable. 5 a That is, in measuring the alcoholic content in a defendant's breath or blood, scientific tests had advanced to the point at
which a reasonable conclusion could be made that anyone with a certain level of alcohol was presumably impaired. 52 In contrast, there are
a "vast number of contraband drugs [and] difficulties in measuring the
concentration of these drugs with precision. '53 In conducting this
analysis, the court relied on the Gassman court's analysis of Dr. Ben54
son's testimony verbatim.
According to the court, these variances made it impossible to uniformly determine the amount of impairment for different levels of
drug ingestion. 55 Thus, the absolute bar on narcotics was a reasonable
Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 1994) (No. 75596) (citations
omitted).
45. See Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 551; see also 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a)(5) (1992).
46. Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 549-50. Specifically, the defendant in Fate alleged that section 11501(a)(5) was unconstitutional for four reasons: it "failed to require a 'knowing' mens rea; violated due process as an improper exercise of police power; violated equal protection; and was
unconstitutionally vague." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 44, at 4-5.
47. Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 550. In other words, the defendant argued that the statute created an
absolute liability offense.
48. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 44, at 1-2.
49. Id. at 5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 550.
51. Id. at 550-51 (comparing the effects of marijuana to PCP).
52. Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 551. In Illinois, this level is 0.08 percent. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11501(a)(1) (2010).
53. Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 551.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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exercise of Illinois's police power, justified by the legitimate goal of
keeping drugged drivers off the road. 56

C. A New Statutory Scheme
In 1999, in People v. Cervantes, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
Public Act 88-680, which included amendments to the arrangement
and penalties of Illinois's aggravated DUI law, violated the single-subject rule of the Illinois constitution. 57 In response, the Illinois legislature re-amended the DUI statute in order to remove any confusion
about its validity. 58 However, the amendment did not directly affect
the drugged driving statute, which essentially remains the same today
and provides:
(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any
vehicle within this State while:
(6) there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in
the person's breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful
use or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis Control
Act, a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, an intoxicating compound listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act, or methamphetamine as listed in the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act. 59

While the Public Act was broken up after Cervantes in order to avoid
violation of the single-subject rule, the legislature has changed almost
nothing in this specific subsection since 1994, when the Illinois Supreme Court decided Fate.60 It did, however, add to the list of narcotics for which a defendant can be found liable, including all substances
listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds, and Methamphetamine
Control and Community Protection Acts. 61 Thus, while the actual
56. Id.
57. People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ill. 1999) ("We believe that Public Act 88-680 is
an example of the very evil the single-subject rule is intended to prevent." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Act effective Jan. 1, 1995, No. 88-680, sec. 20-900, § 11-501, 1994 I11.
Laws 2750, 2772-74.
58. See Act effective Apr. 13, 2000, No. 91-692, sec. 20-900, § 11-501, 2000 II. Laws 48, 50-53.
As to the purpose of this enactment, the general assembly declared, "It is the purpose of this Act
to re-enact the provisions of Public Act 88-680 amending the Illinois Vehicle Code, including
subsequent amendments. This re-enactment is intended to remove any question as to the validity or content of those provisions." Id. at 49.
59. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a)(6) (2010).
60. Compare id., with 625 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a)(5) (1994). However, when the Illinois
legislature added a new subsection (a)(3) to the DUI statute, the prohibition on drugged driving
moved from subsection (a)(5) to (a)(6). See Act effective Jan. 1, 1999, No. 90-779, sec. 5, § 11501, 1998 I11.
Laws 4576-77.
61. See Act effective Jan. 1, 2008, No. 95-355, sec. 10, § 11-501, 2007 Ill. Laws 5821, 5844-45;
Act effective Jan. 1, 1999, No. 90-779, sec. 5, § 11-501, 1998 Il1. Laws 4576-77.
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statute addressed by Fate no longer exists, the total ban on any

62
amount of controlled substance in a driver's body remains in effect.

D.

The Effects of Pomykala

In 2003, the legislature introduced a new aggravating factor to the
DUI statute.63 This factor is implicated whenever a person commits

misdemeanor DUI and is involved in a motor vehicle "accident that
result[s] in the death of another person." 64 The legislature added this
aggravating factor to a list of ten others, all of which result in a felony
conviction.

65

The legislature's adoption of section 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) closely fol-

66
lowed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Pomykala.

In Pomykala, the defendant was charged with two counts of reckless
homicide after his car crossed the median of a divided highway and
struck an oncoming car, killing its two occupants. 67 At the time of the
accident, the reckless homicide statute-listed in a different part of
the Code than the DUI statute-stated that "[i]n cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug
or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be
evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the con62. See People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058, 1064 (Ill. 2011) (following the reasoning in Fate).
63. Specifically, the legislature added section (d)(1)(F) to the DUI statute. See Act effective
July 18, 2003, No. 93-213, sec. 5, § 11-501, 2003 Ill. Laws 2120, 2120-24.
64. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (2010). The relevant text provides:
(1) Every person convicted of committing a violation of this Section shall be guilty of
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating
compound or compounds, or any combination thereof if:
(F) the person, in committing a violation of paragraph (a), was involved in a motor
vehicle, snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft accident that resulted in the
death of another person, when the violation of paragraph (a) was a proximate cause
of the death.
Id.
65. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(2) (2010). For a list of all current aggravating factors, see 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(d)(1)(A)-(K) (2010).
66. People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784 (Ill. 2003).
67. See id. at 786. At the time, the reckless homicide statute provided:
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the
death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and
he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of
the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide.
(b) In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any
other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence
of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(a)-(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
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trary. ' '68 When the police arrived at the scene of the accident, they
conducted a breathalyzer test on the defendant and discovered that he
had a BAC of 0.21.69 The defendant was subsequently charged with
reckless homicide and, because he was over the legal limit of alcohol,
was presumed to have been acting recklessly. 70 The defendant challenged the statute on the grounds that it created a mandatory pre71
sumption of guilt against him.
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and declared
that section 5/9-3(b) was unconstitutional because it imposed a
mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt to a criminal offense,
which impermissibly shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove
recklessness. 72 The court severed the section from the rest of the
73
statute.
In response, the Illinois legislature added an aggravating factor to
the DUI law, which proscribed the same activity as the statute that the
Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Pomykala.74 In fact,
the legislature repealed the offending section of the reckless homicide
statute, and enacted a new section in the DUI statute in the same
legislative act;7 5 it seems to have simply shifted the same prohibition
76
to a new place in the Code.
Amidst all of the changes within the Illinois Vehicle Code, and Illinois law generally, one thing seems to have remained the same: the
absolute bar on controlled substances in drivers' systems. First, the
77
constitutionality of the drugged driving statute was upheld in Fate.
A few years after Fate, the legislature enacted an entirely new statu68. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(b) (2000).

69. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 786.
70. Id. at 786-87.
71. See id. at 787.
72. Id. at 790 ("A reasonable juror would assume from a reading of the instruction that, once
the State established that the defendant was intoxicated, it had proved recklessness, unless the
defendant produced sufficient evidence to disprove it.").
73. Id. at 791.
74. See Act effective July 18, 2003, No. 93-213, sec. 5, § 11-501, 2003 Ill. Laws 2120, 2120-24.
75. See id.; Act effective July 18, 2003, No. 93-213, sec. 7, § 9-3, 2003 Ill. Laws 2120, 2125-26.
76. See Theodore A. Gottfried & Peter G. Baroni, Presumptions,Inferences, and Strict Liability in Illinois Criminal Law: Preemptingthe Presumption of Innocence?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV.

715, 738 (2008) ("[T]he legislative reaction to Pomykala was to remove the offending presumption in the reckless homicide statute and, in the same bill, add a special sentencing enhancement
to the Aggravated DUI statute requiring the same increased penalty in that offense as was attached to the reckless homicide presumption."). The new law has been challenged with little
success: the activity is now proscribed within a traffic regulation section, under which presumptions of guilt are often deemed to be constitutionally acceptable. See Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
77. People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. 1994).
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tory scheme, but retained the absolute ban. 78 Then, following Pomykala, the legislature simply moved the mandatory presumption of
guilt from the criminal code to the vehicle code. 79 It is within this
context that the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to decide the case
that is the subject of this Note. 80

III.

PEOPLE V. MARTIN

On December 25, 2004, Aaron Martin was at a bar in Peoria, Illinois.81 He left around 10 PM and, on his way home, his vehicle crossed
the centerline of the highway and struck an oncoming car.r2 Both
people in the other vehicle were killed and Martin was taken to a
nearby hospital. 83 The police arrested him shortly thereafter and took
samples of his urine and blood.8 4 The tests revealed that Martin's
blood contained no alcohol or controlled substances. 85 His urine,
however, contained very small traces of methamphetamine. 86 In addition to the original charges of improper lane usage and driving on the
wrong side of the road, Martin was indicted on one count of aggra87
vated DUI.
The State began its case-in-chief by introducing evidence that Martin's vehicle crossed the centerline at a curve, veered into oncoming
traffic, and struck another car. 88 In addition, the State called 'Martin's
friend, who stated that she had ceased raising money to help Martin
pay for his medical bills after she received an anonymous tip informing her that Martin had been using methamphetamines.8 9 She reported confronting Martin about this, stating that Martin confessed to
using methamphetamine on prior occasions, but that he was not using
it at the time of the accident. 90 Finally, the State called the forensic
scientist who had discovered the presence of methamphetamines in
78. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010).
79. See id. § (d)(1)(F).
80. People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058, 1059 (Ill. 2011).
81. See id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1060.
85. Id.
86. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060.
87. Id.
88. Id. The State introduced evidence from an eyewitness, an accident reconstructionist, and
a forensic pathologist. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Specifically, defendant stated, "I have done crystal meth before, but I was not on
crystal meth that night." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court noted that
"[t]he defendant did not indicate to Graham when he had last used methamphetamine." Id.
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Martin's body. 91 The expert testified that her tests found no indication that defendant had any amount of narcotics in his blood stream. 92
However, she had discovered trace amounts of methamphetamine in
93
his urine.
Martin called a forensic toxicologist as his only witness. 94 This expert testified that it was his opinion that, to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, "the urine sample of the defendant [did] not contain detectable amounts, realistic amounts of amphetamines."9 5 Despite this testimony, the jury found Martin guilty of aggravated DUI
and the trial judge sentenced him to six years imprisonment. 96 Martin
97
appealed.
The appellate court reversed Martin's conviction for aggravated
DUI and remanded for a sentencing hearing on the lesser charge of
misdemeanor DUI. 98 In an unpublished opinion, the court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin had committed misdemeanor DUI by presenting sufficient
evidence that methamphetamine, while only in a small amount, was
discovered in his urine. 99 However, the court examined the legislative
history of the aggravated DUI section under which Martin was
charged and determined that the legislature intended that the infraction-the presence of narcotics in a defendant's body-be the proximate cause of the victims' deaths. 10 0 In other words, the appellate
court determined that "the State must draw some relationship between the presence of methamphetamine in Martin's urine while he
was operating a motor vehicle . . . and the deaths that resulted from
the motor vehicle accident." 1'0 Thus, according to the appellate court,
to obtain a conviction, the State needed to show that the impairment,
91. Id.
92. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060.
93. Id. The court described the forensic scientists' testing process as follows:
A preliminary screening test indicated that a small amount of "some sort of drug of the
amphetamine class" could be present in the samples. [The forensic scientist] then performed a gas chromatography mass spectrometry test, looking for a wide range of
drugs. She found nothing significant. She then performed a more specific spectrometry
test, looking for drugs in the amphetamine class. That test revealed the presence of
methamphetamine, though it did not indicate how much.
Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1060.
98. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060.
99. Id. at 1061.
100. Id.
101. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not merely the fact that the defendant was driving, was a proximate
cause of the deaths. 10 2 Because the State did not prove a causal connection between the trace amounts of methamphetamine and the accident, the appellate court determined that the lower court committed
10 3
reversible error in convicting Martin of aggravated DUI.
When the State appealed the decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
was tasked with deciding "whether the proximate cause requirement
of section 11-501(d)(1)(F) means that the State must prove the defendant's drug use, rather than his driving, caused the deaths."'1 4 Because the statute was unclear as to whether this aggravating factor
required proof of impairment or not, the court examined the legislative intent. 10 5
The Illinois Supreme Court stated that it had already determined
the legislature's intent in Fate, in which it stated that "the statute is
intended to keep drug-impaired drivers off of the road.' 0 6 The court
then followed its reasoning in Fate:
At the lowest levels of drug ingestion, no one is impaired. At the
highest levels, all are impaired. In the vast middle range, however,
the tolerance for drugs varies from person to person and drug to
drug. In this range, depending on the drug and depending on the
person, some will be impaired and some will not be impaired at
all ....
...The flat prohibition against driving with any amount of a controlled substance in one's system was considered necessary because
"there is no standard that one can come up with by which, unlike
alcohol in the bloodstream, one
can determine whether one is...
10 7
driving under the influence.'
Accordingly, the court upheld the rule espoused in Fate-allpersons
with any amount of a controlled substance in their system are deemed
to be impaired. 08 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the DUI stat102. Id.
103. Id. at 1061. There were two additional opinions written at the appellate court level, in
which both the judges concurred in part and dissented in part, neither of which were published.
Id.
104. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1063.
2006)) ("In determining the legisla105. Id. (citing People v. Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1000 (Ill.
ture's intent, however, we may consider not only the statutory language, but also the reason and
necessity for the law, the problems that lawmakers sought to remedy, and the goals that they
sought to achieve.").
106. Id. (quoting People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 549, 550 (Ill. 1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
107. ld. at 1063-64 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is noteworthy that this statement, the internal quotation cited in Martin,was not made by a medical professional or a scientific researcher, but rather a Senator, and the court accepted it as conclusive.
108. Id. at 1064.
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ute was rationally related to the government's legitimate end and was
justified because of the difficulties in measuring the effects of various
controlled substances on different people. 10 9 Thus, the statute was
constitutional.' 10
The court went on to state that "aggravated DUI is simply misdemeanor DUI with an aggravating factor, which turns the offense into a
felony."1 1 It explained that while there are six ways to commit DUI
in Illinois, two of these presume impairment, rather than requiring
proof of actual impairment: the driver is presumed impaired if (1) the
driver's BAC is above 0.08 or (2) there are is any amount of controlled
substance in his or her system."12 Therefore, according to the court in
Martin, "whether proof of impairment is necessary to sustain a conviction for aggravated DUI under subsection 11-501(d)(1)(F) depends
upon whether impairment is an element of the underlying misdemeanor DUI." 3 When the underlying misdemeanor involves the
strict liability ban on controlled substances, "section 11-501(d)(1)(F)
requires a causal link only between the physical act of driving and
another person's death. In such a case, the central issue at trial will he
11 4
proximate cause, not impairment.
Thus, because a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty
of section 11-501(a)(6)-which does not require proof of impairment-Martin was convicted of a felony simply because his driving
was the proximate cause of the victims' deaths. 1 5 With this holding,
the court created the potential for criminal liability on any driver in
Illinois with any amount of narcotic, including marijuana, in his
system.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Martin is troubling for several reasons. Perhaps the most problematic issue is that the rationale underlying the court's decision is flawed;
at least with regard to marijuana, the scientific facts presented by the
expert are no longer valid. The constitutionality of the legislation is
also questionable and has been attacked on several occasions."16 One
particularly compelling argument is that the statute creates an uncon109. Id.
110. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1064.
111. Id.
112. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (a)(1)-(6) (2010).
113. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1064.
114. Id. at 1065.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., People v. Ziltz, 455 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ill.
1983) (arguing that the statute violated
due process because it shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defendant); People v.
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stitutional mandatory presumption of guilt for a criminal offense.1 1 7
Because significant problems exist in both the rationale underlying the
DUI statute and the way in which it is implemented, the Illinois legislature should adopt a new statutory scheme that differentiates between marijuana and other drugs, a distinction foreclosed by the
Martin court's reasoning. Specifically, when a driver's blood is tested
and the test determines that the marijuana was not affecting his driving, he should not be charged with DUI. Thus, instead of punishing
drivers who have only inactive marijuana remnants in their bodies, the
legislature should amend the law so that it only punishes those who
are driving while actually "under the influence." Until that time, due
to the Martin court's flawed reasoning, the state can impose criminal
liability on all drivers with remnants of marijuana or any other narcotic in their systems, even when those drivers are not inebriated.
A.

The Toxicology of Marijuana

Before analyzing the way in which the Martin court misapplied its
rationale to marijuana, it is necessary to understand the basic science
behind the substance. A brief examination of the chemical properties
of marijuana will suffice for the purpose of this Note. The most prevalent psychoactive component in marijuana is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol, commonly referred to as "THC. '' 118 When a person ingests
marijuana through inhaling smoke, 119 this component enters his or her
bloodstream through the lungs, and ultimately affects the brain
through "cannabinoid receptors. ' 120 As the bloodstream continues to
carry THC through the body, the drug gradually breaks down, with a
peak level of THC being delivered to the brain within several minutes
of ingestion. 12 1 However, as the drug continues to circulate within the
body, it continually breaks down, or metabolizes, and the active comBriseno, 799 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague); People v. Kappas, 458 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Il. App. Ct. 1983) (same).
117. See Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1064.
118. M. A. Huestis, Cannabis (Marijuana)-Effectson Human Behavior and Performance, 14

FORENSIC Sci. REV. 15, 17 (2002) ("Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the primary psychoactive analyte, is found in the plant's flowering or fruity tops, leaves, and resin."); see generally C.
Heather Ashton, Pharmacologyand Effects of Cannabis:A Brief Review, 178 BRIT. J. PsYcHoL.

101 (2001) (summarizing recent scientific advances in understanding marijuana, including the
prevalence of use, the body's response to ingestion, and the effects of the drug on the brain).
119. Smoking is the most common form of ingestion. See Huestis, supra note 118, at 21
("Smoking, the principal route of cannabis administration, provides a rapid and highly efficient
method of drug delivery.").
120. Id. at 18-19 (discussing the "mechanisms of action" of THC, and the authors' work on
mapping the "cannabinoid receptors" of the brain).
121. Id. at 21-22 (stating that the highest levels of THC discovered in the blood's plasma
occurred on average around nine minutes after ingestion).
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ponent of THC breaks into "metabolites," which are simply byprod122
ucts of this process.
One of these byproducts is called 11-nor-9-carboxy-delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THCCOOH) and constitutes the most prevalent
substance that remains after the body eliminates the active component
of the THC. 123 While other metabolites also exist, and while some of
these are pharmacologically active, due to the significant and prolonged research on marijuana, scientists have determined which of
these affect the brain, and which do not and are thus inactive. 124
THCCOOH itself, like several other metabolites, has no pharmacological effect on a person, though it can remain in the body long after
the active THC has been removed. 125
Urinalysis most often searches for the presence of inactive metabolites like THCCOOH, not for THC itself.126 But because THCCOOH
is inactive, urinalysis reveals only that the tested person has ingested
cannabis at some point in the recent past; it does not give any information about one's impairment level. 127 Blood tests, however, are
able to differentiate proportional levels of THC, THCCOOH, and
other metabolites. 128 For up to several hours after ingestion, the ratio
of active to inactive drug circulating within the body is in flux, and the
amount of impairment cannot be determined via blood analysis. 129

However, these tests are able to determine when all of the THC is

122. Id. at 16-24.
123. Id. at 22 ("The inactive THCCOOH metabolite and its glucuronide conjugate have been
identified as the major end products of biotransformation in most species, including man.").
124. For a summary of the major metabolites, see Ashton, supra note 118, at 103 tbl.1.
125. Huestis, supra note 118, at 22 ("The time course of detection of THCCOOH is much
longer than ... that of THC."); see also People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Mich. 2006).
126. See generally M.A. Huestis et al., Detection Times of MarijuanaMetabolites in Urine by
Immunoassay and GC-MS, 19 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 443-49 (1995) (describing the tests conducted on urine, and the length of time possible for detection of marijuana metabolites).
127. See P. Swann, Road Safety Dep't, VicRoads, The Real Risk of Being Killed When Driving Whilst Impaired by Cannabis (2000), available at http://www.nefn.orglpdflThe%20Real%20
Risk%200f%2oBeing%2OKilled%2oWhen%2oDriving%2OWhilst%20Impaired.pdf ("Australian studies of drivers killed have only identified drivers who were cannabis users by measuring
[THCCOOH], which can remain detectable in body fluids weeks after cannabis use [although]
impairment after cannabis use only persists for hours .... ").
128. See Huestis, supra note 118, at 23 (describing the concentrations of several marijuana
components in plasma at different points after ingestion).
129. See id. at 31 (stating that certain proportions of THC concentration in blood cannot be
related to a measurable level of impairment).
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broken down, and the only remaining components are inactive.' 30 At
131
this point, the user is no longer impaired.
Therefore, determining impairment is difficult, but possible. More
importantly, scientists cannot determine whether a person is currently
impaired by testing his urine. Using only urinalysis, they can neither
predict levels of impairment based on the amount consumed, nor determine the level of impairment when active marijuana components
are in the user's body. In contrast, blood tests are able to reveal when
all of the active THC has broken down, and when only inactive components remain. Thus, the use of blood tests can indicate when the
user is no longer impaired.
B.

The Martin Court's Flawed Rationale Regarding Marijuana

The Martin court's rationale, upon which it upheld the absolute liability imposition of the DUI statute, was not sound with regard to
marijuana. The court upheld the absolute ban on the presence of narcotics in a driver's system because, unlike alcohol, various drugs have
unknown effects on drivers, making the development of a standard by
which to judge impairment impossible. 132 This analysis, while perhaps
true for many drugs, should not be applied to marijuana.
As described above, no test can predict the level of impairment after a person ingests a certain amount of marijuana, especially when
taken in combination with another drug or alcohol. However, in the
special case of marijuana, scientists can certainly differentiate between
active and inactive marijuana remnants in a person's body. 133 When
blood tests show that the remnants of the psychoactive component in
marijuana are wholly inactive, the person who ingested it is conclusively not impaired. 134 That is, for marijuana, a usable standard does
exist: when all of the components remaining in a person's blood
stream are inactive, a driver is not impaired and should not be subject
to a DUI. Conversely, if any of the components are still active, because levels of impairment cannot be conclusively determined, they
130. See id. at 22 (stating that "the concentration of the inactive THCCOOH metabolite
predominated from as early as one hour after dosing," and discussing how THC and other active
metabolites gradually decreased over time).
131. See id.
132. See People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. 2011); People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549 (Iil.
1994).
133. See Huestis, supra note 118, 16-24 (2002).
134. See People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67, 82 (Mich. 2010) ("11-carboxy-THC itself has no
known pharmacological effect on the body." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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could be "driving under the influence," and liability is appropriate.
135
This standard is certainly viable, and already exists in other states.
Of course, the defendant in Martin was convicted due to the presence of methamphetamine, not marijuana. 13 6 His conviction may
have been entirely appropriate for this drug. But, the ramifications
for Martin exceed the guilt of this single defendant: any driver in Illinois with any amount of narcotics, including marijuana, in his system,
is subject to not only DUI, but aggravated DUI if aggravating factors
are present. 137 Because the court failed to recognize the distinctions
between marijuana and other drugs, its' reasoning in Martin is incomplete. Accordingly, the Illinois legislature should rework the drugged
DUI statute in order to accommodate current scientific methods of
marijuana detection.
C.

The Illinois Statute Creates an Unconstitutional
Presumption of Guilt

Even if one accepts the reasoning relied upon in Martin, the court
also failed to consider that the DUI statute may create an unconstitutional presumption of guilt. "A presumption is a legal device that permits or requires the fact-finder to assume the existence of an ultimate
1' 38 It
fact, after certain predicate or basic facts have been established.
139
may be either permissive or mandatory.
"A permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the fact-finder to infer the existence
'140
of the ultimate or presumed fact upon proof of the predicate fact.
A mandatory presumption requires the fact-finder to accept the
fact. 141 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that mandatory conclusive
presumptions concerning criminal allegations are unconstitutional because they conflict with the presumption of innocence. 42 The Illinois
judiciary has taken this protection one step further, holding that even
mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of production to the defendant are unconstitutional. 143 "Thus, under Illinois
135. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.625(8) (2006 & Supp. 2012); see People v. Feezel, 783
N.W.2d 67, 77 (Mich. 2010).
136. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060. Note, however, that the defendant in Fate had marijuana in
his system. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Il. 1994).
137. Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060.
138. People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ill.
2003).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See People v. Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill.
1998).
142. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979).
143. Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 322-23.
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cases are ... now considlaw, all mandatory presumptions in criminal
144
ered to be per se unconstitutional.
Contrary to these prohibitions, the addition of certain aggravating
factors to the drugged DUI statute creates a mandatory presumption
of guilt and, in fact, was enacted simply to circumvent these constitutional problems. The drugged DUI subsection was enacted in direct
response to People v. Pomykala, which held that it was unconstitutional for a person to be presumed inebriated for the criminal offense
of reckless driving.1 45 The legislature, reacting swiftly to the Pomykala ruling, removed the unconstitutional reckless homicide statute
and enacted a new aggravated DUI section, which is applicable to accidents in which death occurs, only a year after the Pomykala decision. 146 Theodore Gottfried and Peter Baroni, writing about the
history of expanding presumptions in Illinois, recently commented on
Pomykala and the legislature's reaction:
The legislative reaction to Pomykala was to remove the offending
presumption in the reckless homicide statute and, in the same bill,
add a special sentencing enhancement to the Aggravated DUI statute requiring the same increased penalty in that offense as was attached to the reckless homicide presumption. This change
effectively circumvented the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Pomykala by adding the offending penalty enhancement to the
strict liability offense of Aggravated DUI, effectively removing the
to prove recklessness in order to get
prosecutions [sic] obligation
147
the enhanced sentence.
In doing so, the Illinois legislature made the exact same conduct that
was at issue in Pomykala-being involved in an accident that led to a
the influence-a strict liability ofperson's death while driving under
148
statute.
DUI
the
under
fense
Simply moving the law to a new place in the Code, however, did not
cure the statute's constitutional failures. A mandatory presumption of
guilt still exists: if the State establishes that the defendant has any
amount of narcotic in his system and that his driving at least partly
caused a fatal accident, he is irrefutably presumed guilty of aggravated
DUI. 149 In other words, the presence of narcotics makes a defendant
guilty of "driving under the influence" without proof that he was ine144. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d at 788.
145. See People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 787-88 (Ill. 2003).
146. See Act effective July 18, 2003, No. 93-213, sec. 5, § 11-501, 2003 Ill. Laws 2120, 2120-24;
Act effective July 18, 2003, No. 93-213, sec. 7, § 9-3, 2003 111.Laws 2120, 2125-26; see also Gottfried & Baroni, supra note 76, at 738.
147. Gottfried & Baroni, supra note 78, 738.
148. See id. at 737-38.
149. See id.
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briated at the time of the accident, or that his inebriation caused the
accident. Further, and perhaps even worse, a defendant is not offered
the opportunity to rebut the presumption of impairment. 150
The statute at issue in Martin creates a mandatory presumption of
guilt, and while it is true that it is listed as a traffic offense in the Code,
it is no less a criminal statute in nature than the unconstitutional reckless homicide statute.' 51 This presumption of guilt is especially egregious in two situations. First, a defendant is irrefutably guilty even
when she can prove that the drugs were not affecting her at all at the
time in question.152 Second, she is still guilty of aggravated DUI, even
when she can conclusively prove that the drugs were not the cause of
the fatal accident; indeed, even when the evidence shows that her
driving was only one of the proximate causes of the accident.1 53
Therefore, the Illinois DUI statute is unconstitutional because it imposes a mandatory presumption of guilt on sober drivers simply because they have inactive marijuana metabolites in their bodies.
D. Other ConstitutionalProblems with the Statute
Several other complaints have been raised concerning the DUI statute. First, the statute operates on a strict-liability basis despite a statutory ban prohibiting this type of legislation. Illinois statutory law
prohibits the imposition of strict liability unless the prohibition carries
a small penalty-a fine less than $1000-or the legislature has displayed a clear intent to impose strict liability. 154 Aggravated DUI carries a felony sentence, which means that a clear legislative intent
would be required to justify the imposition of strict liability. While
the Fate and Martin courts did not directly address this issue, the best
argument for finding a clear intent to impose strict liability is the statutory language prohibiting "any" amount of drug being found in a
driver's system. 55
However, aside from this single word, there is nothing in the statutory language that clearly evidences the legislature's intent to impose
150. See People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058, 1064-65 (I11.2011).
151. See People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 787-88 (I11.2003).
152. This was arguably the case in Martin. See Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060.
153. Cf. id.
154. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (2010). The full text of the statute reads:
A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of
the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is a misdemeanor
which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability
for the conduct described.
Id.
155. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(a)(6) (2010).
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liability without proving a culpable mental state. 156 Nor does the legislature use words that clearly remove a court's obligation to determine causation-for example, whether the influence of the drug
ingestion caused a fatal accident. 157 In other words, "any" is ambiguous and does not evidence a clear legislative intent to impose absolute
58
liability.
Furthermore, an examination of the legislative history does not reveal a clear intent to impose strict liability. Sponsored by Senator
David Barkhausen, the addition of the drugged driving law prohibition came by way of amendment to the existing statute. 159 Discussion
of the proposal was brought to the senate floor on May 25, 1989.160 It
appears that some Illinois senators were concerned that the amendment would impose strict liability. 161 Senator Barkhausen responded
to some of the concerns raised, stating that the reason the amendment
did not impose liability based on a minimum amount of ingestion was
that no standard existed that could measure the resulting amount of
inebriation. 162 However, he never spoke about any intent to eliminate
a mens rea component or a proximate cause analysis. 163 Based on the
language of the statue and this legislative history, to argue that the
legislature "clearly" intended to make the statute apply on a strictliability basis seems far-fetched.
A second reason that the statute has been attacked is because it
may be unconstitutionally vague. Statutes are unconstitutionally
vague when the legislature does not include language giving minimal
guidelines to police, allowing them to conduct a "standardless sweep"
164
based on their own biases and predilections.
This is especially problematic with regard to marijuana, which can
remain in a person's blood for eighteen hours and in a person's urine
for four weeks after ingestion. Therefore, under the current statutory
scheme, it is a crime for a defendant to drive even after any possible
156. See id. Arguably, if either of these intents were "clear," the appellate court in Martin
would not have held to the contrary. See Martin, 955 N.E.2d at 1060.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Senate Transcript, 86th Gen. Assembly, 36th Legislative Day, at 20 (Ill. May 25,
1989), http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans86/ST052589.pdf.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 21-22 (statement of Sen. Marovitz) ("You call for no connection between the performance of that automobile and the ingestion of the drugs. I think this amendment is not well
thought out .... ).
162. See id. at 23 (statement of Sen. Barkhausen). Again, this reasoning is flawed with regard

to marijuana. See id.
163. See id.
164. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
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impairment has dissipated. A driver that has ingested marijuana
weeks prior to driving is at constant risk of being subject to a
"standardless sweep." Furthermore, the DUI statute gives no guidelines as to its enforcement. 165 That is, in enforcing the drugged driver
statute, a police officer could simply have a hunch, or act on a
"whim," in choosing whom to investigate. 166 Worse, the officer could
do so on a discriminatory or veiled racial basis, and choose to harass

groups that he or she does not like by stopping them on a pretextual
basis.

167

Third, as the appellate court held in Fate,168 these statutes do not
bear a rational relationship to the state's goal of keeping drugged drivers off of the road. 169 The drugged driving statute does not differentiate between narcotics or between active and inactive traces of
narcotics in a defendant's system. 170 Therefore, it is irrational to

charge a person with DUI-especially aggravated DUI-if she ingested marijuana days or weeks ago and then chose to drive when she
was completely sober. 171 Arresting entirely sober drivers for DUI is
not rationally related to the state's goal of keeping impaired drivers
off of the roadways.
While none of these arguments have gained traction within the Illinois Supreme Court, the appellate courts have deemed some of them
persuasive, as evidenced by their holdings in Fate and Martin.a72
E.

The Michigan Scheme: A Reasonable Alternative

To cure these problems, the Illinois DUI statute needs to be
amended. The legislature should adopt a statute that differentiates

between active and inactive components in marijuana. The Michigan
scheme already successfully makes this distinction. At first blush, the
165. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010).
166. People v. Feezel, 783 N.w.2d 67, 84 (Mich. 2010).
167. Unfortunately, this type of action is not barred unless it is explicitly motivated by race.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[T]he Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race [but] [s]ubjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). One could easily imagine situations with regard to the DUI in which, because of the lack of guidelines, the officer enforces the
DUI law pretextually. This is precisely the type of activity the Court feared in Kolender. See
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58.
168. See People v. Fate, 636 N.E.2d 549, 550 (11. 1994).
169. See, e.g., People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 846 (Mich. 2006) (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting),
overruled by People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67, 81 (Mich. 2010).
170. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010).
171. See Derror,715 N.W.2d at 846 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("There is no rational reason
to charge a person who inhaled marijuana two weeks ago and who now decides to drive to the
store to pick up a gallon of milk.").
172. See People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ill. 2011); Fate, 636 N.E.2d at 551.
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Michigan drugged driving statute is similar to that of Illinois.173 In the
recent case of People v. Feezel, however, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that while the statute prohibited the presence of any amount of
certain controlled substances in a driver's body, 174 the metabolite 11carboxy-THC did not constitute a controlled substance for the purposes of the Operation of a Vehicle While Intoxicated (OWI) statute. 175 This holding effectively creates an exemption from the OWI
statute for inactive marijuana metabolites, as is recommended by this
Note.
In Feezel, the Michigan Supreme Court revisited its 2006 decision,
People v. Derror.176 The Derrorcourt, much like the Illinois Supreme
Court in Fate and Martin, held that the presence of any amount 1 of
77
drug, whether active or not, was adequate for a DUI conviction.
This ruling also involved the court's interpretation of Michigan's OWl
statute, which prohibited driving while "any amount" of a controlled
substance is in a person's body.1 78 The Derrorcourt, over a vigorous
dissent, held that 11-carboxy-THC and other inactive by-products of
narcotics were derivatives of schedule 1 controlled substances and that
these in any amount
the State need only prove the presence of any of179
conviction:
OWI
an
in a driver's body to obtain
173. Compare 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010), with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(8)
(2006 & Supp. 2012).
174. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(8) (2011).
175. People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67, 80-81 (Mich. 2010).
176. See id. at 71.
177. See People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 831 (Mich. 2006).
178. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(8) (2006). The statute in pertinent part states:
A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other
place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an
area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state if the person has in his or
her body any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212
of the public health code ....
Id. (emphasis added).
179. Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 830-31. In doing so, the court examined the definition of marijuana according to the Michigan code:
"Marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., growing or not; the seeds
thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. It does
not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake
made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7106(3) (2006). The Derrorcourt defined "derivative" as "a chemical
substance related structurally to another substance and theoretically derivable from it." Derror,
715 N.W.2d at 828 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this definition, the court concluded that 11-carboxy-THC was included in the statute because the compound is structurally
related to THC. See id. at 830-33.
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The Feezel court disagreed. First, the court held that 11-carboxyTHC was not a controlled substance. 180 The court recognized that
"the purpose of banning marijuana was to ban the euphoric effects
produced by THC," but noted that 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effect. 81 Thus, the Feezel court viewed itself as bringing
Michigan law in line with federal law.' 82
Additionally, the court examined a set of statutory factors that
helped determine whether or not a substance should be classified as a
schedule 1 controlled substance, which would make its presence in a
driver's system illegal.1 83 None of these factors applied to li-carboxyTHC because it had no pharmacological effect, was not habit forming,
and did not lead to dependence. 184 For these reasons, the court held
that "a person cannot be prosecuted under [the OWI statute] for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his or
her system."1 85 Thus, while the Michigan OWI statute, on its face,
does not differentiate between active and inactive pharmacological
components of marijuana, the Feezel court did.
The Illinois legislature should pursue one of two different courses.
First, it could amend the DUI statute itself. The statute currently prohibits any amount of 'any type of narcotic from being in a driver's system. 186 The legislature could simply amend the statute to read "any
pharmacologically active" drug, substance, or compound. That is, an
entirely sober person could not be prosecuted for DUI weeks after
ingesting marijuana when he is pulled over on the whim of a police
officer. This approach goes further than the Michigan scheme because
180. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d at 83.
181. Id. at 82.
182. Cf. id.

183. Id. These factors included:
(a) The actual or relative potential for abuse.
(b) The scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known.
(c) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance.
(d) The history and current pattern of abuse.
(e) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.
(f) The risk to the public health.
(g) The potential of the substance to produce psychic or physiological dependence
liability.
(h) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this article.
Id. (citing MICH. Comp. LAws § 333.7202).
184. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d at 82.
185. Id. at 83.
186. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2010).
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it would exempt all inactive metabolites instead of those strictly re187
lated to marijuana.
Alternatively, the legislature could make a special exception for
marijuana, just as the Feezel court did. This may be desirable because
the by-products of marijuana use can remain in a person's body much
longer than many other drugs. 188 This longevity makes someone who
ingests marijuana an especially vulnerable target for an unjust DUI
conviction. This may also be more appropriate because of the ease
with which the tests can determine whether or not the remnants of
marijuana in a person's system are active or inactive, which may not
be feasible for other drugs. The legislature could accomplish this goal
by explicitly defining 11-carboxy-THC as not being a drug, substance,
or compound under the DUI statute.
Regardless of the method that the legislature chooses, 189 a scheme
that differentiates between active and inactive marijuana components
in a driver's system is preferable to the current law. Revising the statute would not only cure the constitutional problems, but also allow
the legislature to cure the flawed reasoning of Fate and Martin. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the legislature has a chance to
create a statute that would not punish sober defendants for being
''under the influence."
V.

IMPACT

Martin was decided in the midst of an active debate in the legal
arena about narcotics, especially marijuana. Several states have already decriminalized the possession of various amounts of marijuana' 90 and others have legalized medical marijuana.' 91 While no
187. While representing the most radical change, some argue that this step is both desirable
and necessary. Cf.W. Robert Thomas, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for CriminalIntent in an Intent-Free Moral World, 100 MICH. L. REV. 647, 660-61 (2012).
188. See Huestis, supra note 118, at 22.
189. Everything recommended above refers to legislative action. While it is possible that Illinois's judiciary could also take action, the Martin decision seemed to be a step in the opposite
direction. Thus, legislative action appears to be the best and most realistic solution to this
problem.
190. See BRAD TILLES, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF CRIME & JUSTICE, STATES THAT HAVE
DECRIMINALIZED MARIJUANA, CENT. CONN. ST. UNIV. 1-4 (2009), available at http://www.ccsu.

edu/uploaded/images/MarijuanaDecriminalization.pdf.
191. According to a not-for-profit website that has been monitoring this trend, there are currently eighteen states that have some form of medical marijuana program, in addition to the
District of Columbia. See 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, PROCON (last updated Jan. 7, 2013, 1:42 P.M.), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=000881; see also Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot
Program Act, S.B. 1381, 96th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011) ("Although federal law currently prohibits any use of cannabis except under very limited circumstances, Alaska, California,
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legislation has been passed to that effect in Illinois, there have been
significant efforts in the Illinois legislature to legalize medical marijuana. 192 The ruling in Martin is at direct odds with this emerging attitude: they cannot coexist.
The Illinois legislature first considered the Compassionate Use of
Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act in 2008, and has amended this
bill several times. 193 The bill, as it was intended, would have made
several significant changes to the Illinois law with regard to marijuana
use. First, and at direct odds with the hardline opposition to drug use
embodied by the Martin court, the bill specifically stated, "Modern
medical research has discovered beneficial uses for marijuana in treating or alleviating the pain, nausea, and other symptoms associated
with a variety of debilitating medical conditions. 1 94 Furthermore, because the vast majority of prosecutions for marijuana possession occur
under state law, "changing state law [would] have the practical effect
of protecting from arrest the vast majority of seriously ill people who
95
have a medical need to use cannabis."']
For these reasons, the bill essentially provided that a person, after
being diagnosed by a physician as having a debilitating medical condition, would receive an identification card from the Department of
1 96
Public Health, which would permit her to legally possess marijuana.
It would also have amended the Cannabis Control Act to allow for
these changes. 197 With regard to DUI law, the bill stated, "Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to prevent the arrest or prosecution of a
registered qualifying patient for reckless driving or driving under the
'198
influence of cannabis.
Here, the conflict with Martin is obvious. If the Compassionate Use
of Medical Marijuana Act-or its equivalent-ever passes in Illinois,
the Martin decision forces those being treated with marijuana for
chronic, debilitating diseases to make a choice. 199 They must either
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, Rhode
Island, and Washington have removed state-level criminal penalties from the medical use and
cultivation of cannabis.").
192. See, e.g., Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act, S.B. 1381, 96th
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (I11.2011).
193. Id. at 36.
194. Id. at 1.
195. Id. at 1-2.
196. Id. at 9.
197. Id. at 36.
198. Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act, S.B. 1381, 96th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (111.2011).
199. See ALISON MACK & JANET JoY, MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE? THE SCIENCE BEYOND THE
CONTROVERSY 75 (2000).

2013]

NARCOTICS ON ILLINOIS'S ROADWAYS

forego the relief of their pain, or give up driving indefinitely, thereby
seriously disrupting their work and social lives. In other words, even
if those patients chose only to drive after the influence of marijuana
had entirely subsided, they would risk being prosecuted for DUI for
an indeterminate period after their legal ingestion. If this ingestion
occurred on a somewhat regular basis, marijuana remnants would
constantly be in their system, and it would be impossible for those
people to drive legally. This would be unjust.
Such a blanket ban on driving is not even imposed on those suffering from seizures or dementia.2°° When releasing the Driver Fitness
Medical Guidelines, the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) stated, "It is understood that drivers should be allowed to continue to drive as long as possible provided there is a
reasonable expectation that they can safely operate a vehicle. Only
when an individual poses an imminent threat to public safety should
their driving privilege be withdrawn or restricted."' 20 1 Of course, these
are only guidelines. 20 2 However, NHTSA crafted these guidelines to
prevent the absolute ban on driving for those suffering from diabetes,
dementia, sleep apnea, seizures, and other debilitating medical conditions, and instead stated that "[e]ach case will require individual assessment. '' 20 3 It is clear that those who might legally use medical
marijuana, and then drive days or weeks later, represent no imminent
threat to public safety by driving. In fact, it could be argued that these
drivers are likely safer drivers than those suffering from seizures and
dementia. Nonetheless, as the law stands after Martin, even those patients that had legally ingested medical marijuana would likely be prevented from driving in a way unlike any other group of drivers.
While the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program
Act (Compassionate Use Act) was defeated by a mere four votes in
the Illinois senate in January 2011,204 there appears to be some popular support to either renew the vote or create an entirely new bill for

200. See

NATIONAL HIGHWAY

TRAFFIC SAFETY AUTHORITY,

DRIVER MEDICAL FITNESS

54-82 (2009), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/TrafficlnjuryControll
Articles/AssociatedFiles/811210.pdf (imposing guidelines based on individual assessments with
regard to safety).
201. Id. at iii.
GUIDELINES

202. Id.
203. Id. at 54.
204. See Voting History For SB1381, 96th General Assembly, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, available
at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory.asp?GA=96&DocNum=1381&DocTypelD=SB&
GAId=10&LeglD=42617&SessionlD=76.
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the legalization of medical marijuana. 20 5 While the bill did not pass, it
was certainly close, and the mere fact that it was considered represents a clear shift from the zero-tolerance policies of the 1970s and the
6
so-called "War on Drugs. ' 20
In addition to the medical marijuana legislation, in July 2012, Mayor
Rahm Emmanuel and the City Council of Chicago signed a city ordinance that decriminalized possession of marijuana in small
amounts. 20 7 The new ordinance makes the possession of fifteen grams
or less of marijuana a fine-only offense. 20 8 This has been part of a
growing nationwide trend toward decriminalization, which is only
gaining momentum. 20 9 Neither the legislature nor the city council altered the DUI law as a result of this new ordinance. The tension between the absolute prohibition on drugs in drivers' systems and the
decriminalization of their possession of small amounts is clear. It
seems that the current DUI statute and the emerging acceptance of
marijuana in small amounts are pulling in opposite directions, and the
legislature should respond accordingly.
In order to maintain the legitimacy of the DUI law in Illinois, the
Illinois legislature must be responsive to its constituency's evolving attitudes. This may entail enacting a statute similar to the Compassionate Use Act or modifying the definitions of the existing statutes in
order to mitigate the ill-effects of Martin.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Aaron Martin was convicted for aggravated DUI not based on evidence of impairment, but solely on a presumption of guilt that attached to the presence of narcotic metabolites in his body. The
205. See, e.g., Compassionate Use of MarijuanaPilot Program, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECr,
http://www.mpp.org/states/illinois/overview-of-illinois-medical-bills.html
(last visited Feb. 2,
2012).
206. For a complete discussion on the effects, and arguable failure, of the aggressive prosecution and lengthy punishment policies of the War on Drugs, see William F. Buckley et al., The
War on Drugs Is Lost, in BUSTED: STONED CowBoYs, NARCO-LORDS AND WASHINGTON'S WAR

ON DRUGS 197, 198-209 (Mike Gray ed., 2002) (explaining the high cost of the war on drugs in
terms of dollars, court time, and police time, with little success, and no foreseeable end).
207. See Kristen Mack, Chicago OKs Pot Tickets, CHI. TRIB. (June 28, 2012), http://articles.chi
cagotribune.com/2012-06-28/news/ct-met-chicago-city-council-0628-20120628-1-pot-possessionpossession-of-smal-amounts-pot-tickets [hereinafter Mack, Pot Tickets]; Kristen Mack, Chicago
City Council Passes Pot Ticket Ordinance, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2012), http://articles.chicagotrib
une.com/2012-06-27/news/chi-chicago-city-councilpasses-pot-ticket-ordinance-20120627-1-potpossession-pot-ticket-ordinance-marijuana.
208. See Mack, Pot Tickets, supra note 207.
209. Don Babwin, Chicago OKs Tickets for Small Amounts of Marijuana,SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE (June 27, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/un/27/chicago-oks-tickets-forsmall-amounts-of-marijuana/?print&page=all.
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prosecution did not offer any evidence of a culpable mental state at
his trial. Furthermore, the State failed to offer proof of a causal relationship between the effect of his prior drug use and the unfortunate
accident that occurred. Despite these apparent shortcomings, Martin
was sentenced to six years in prison.
The per se drugged DUI statute in Illinois, brought into effect by
the Fate and Martin decisions, creates an unconstitutional presumption of guilt-a defendant is presumed guilty for his or her prior act of
ingesting drugs, even if he or she is conclusively not impaired when
driving. And, to make the error more egregious, this presumption is
not rebuttable; the statute operates on an absolute-liability basis. Furthermore, the reasoning relied upon by the Martin court is flawed because there are now scientific tests that demonstrate how long drug
metabolites can remain in a person's body after impairment has
ceased-at least with regard to marijuana. The Illinois courts and legislature have made a mistake by creating a scheme that punishes those
who have strictly inactive drug components in their system.
The Illinois legislature now has the opportunity to remedy this mistake. There are several options available to achieve this goal, but the
best strategy is to adopt a more rational statutory scheme that exempts marijuana because it differs from other drugs, both in our scientific understanding of it, and in the significant period of time that
detectable inactive components remain in person's system after ingestion. This would also leave room for growth for the emerging trend of
decriminalization of this drug, and for the possible adoption of a statutory medical marijuana program. Michigan and several other states
have already adopted statutory schemes aimed at avoiding the precise
problems described in this Note.
Until the legislature takes action, any person who has used marijuana within the detectable time period will be at constant risk of being charged with DUL. And, if an aggravating factor is present, this
person will be sent to prison upon conviction-even though they were
not "driving under the influence" of anything. Thus, the University of
Illinois student hypothesized above will spend every day in prison for
several years because he smoked marijuana a month before he got
behind the wheel. This is unfair and unacceptable: the legislature
should limit the harm caused by Martin by adopting a new statutory
scheme.
Darron J. Hubbard
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